Security
Security, stated plainly
What protects your traffic, who holds which keys, and where your configuration is stored.
Your traffic
Encrypted between sites, never through us
Traffic between sites and from roaming clients is encrypted with WireGuard (Curve25519, ChaCha20-Poly1305). It flows directly between your own sites; Weft's control plane never carries it.
Keys
WireGuard private keys never leave the device
Every site and every client generates its own WireGuard key. Weft only ever receives the public half, so there is no central store of WireGuard private keys to steal. Weft does hold one private key for each organisation, the key of the certificate authority that signs its sites' certificates, kept encrypted with AWS KMS and bound to that organisation so it can't be unlocked for any other.
Joining
One-time invitations
A site or client joins by redeeming an invitation that works once. A site then proves who it is to the control plane with a certificate issued at enrolment.
Management
No remote shell
Weft does not log in to your machines. Sites open an outbound encrypted connection to the control plane and accept a fixed set of structured instructions, not commands.
Policy
Deny unless permitted
With policy enforced, traffic between your sites and devices is refused unless a contract permits it, and that includes devices in no group. That holds for devices that send from their own network's addresses. Sites don't yet check that they do; that check is planned. Start in log mode to see what would be refused first. Every site checks that the policy in its kernel is still the policy it installed.
Console
Every request needs an identity
Sign in with Google, or with an email address and password, with an optional authenticator app. Or connect your own identity provider yourself from the Settings page: Microsoft Entra ID, or any OpenID Connect provider. Every API route requires a signed-in identity unless it is on a short, reviewed list — sign-in itself, a device's own calls with its own token, the read-only exports your own monitoring reads with a secret you set, and the read-only public demo — and automated tests fail if a route is added without one.
Tenancy
Each customer is scoped
Every console request is confined to one tenant's data, and tests fail the build if a handler reaches past that scope.
Data
Held in London
Configuration, health and public keys are stored in AWS's London region (eu-west-2), encrypted at rest, with point-in-time recovery and deletion protection enabled. Ask Weft, the console's assistant, is the one exception: when someone uses it, a question and the network data needed to answer it go to Anthropic, outside the UK.
Software
Checked before it runs
The site installer, and every agent update, checks the agent's checksum before installing it, which catches a damaged download; agent releases are not yet cryptographically signed. Upgrades roll back automatically if the new version does not come up. The macOS app is signed and notarised by Apple.
Encryption in detail
Weft uses WireGuard for every tunnel, between sites and from roaming clients. WireGuard has one fixed set of algorithms and never negotiates them:
| Purpose | Algorithm |
|---|---|
| Key exchange | Curve25519 (X25519) |
| Encrypting and authenticating each packet | ChaCha20-Poly1305 |
| Hashing and key derivation | BLAKE2s, HKDF |
| Handshake | Noise IK, the Noise protocol framework |
There are no options to choose, so there is nothing to misconfigure and no weaker setting an attacker can push a connection down to. Keys are renewed every two minutes, so a key captured later cannot decrypt traffic recorded earlier (forward secrecy).
FIPS 140: ChaCha20-Poly1305 is not a FIPS-approved algorithm, so Weft's tunnels are not FIPS 140 validated. If your contracts require FIPS-validated encryption, Weft is not the right fit today.
Reporting a vulnerability
Email support@weftnetworks.com with the details. Please do not test against other customers’ networks.